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CHAPTER 1
The History and Current Relevance
of Work Sharing
Persistence of high unemployment over the last several 
years has led many persons to advocate worktime reduction 
as a means of combating joblessness by spreading work 
among a larger number of persons. Proposed approaches for 
sharing work have varied tremendously, including man 
datory reduction of the workweek with and without pay loss 
to employees, various forms of earlier retirement and pro 
longed schooling, extended vacations and worker sab 
baticals, long term exchange of prospective economic growth 
for worktime reductions, increased part-time employment, 
and stimulation of voluntary exchange of current earnings 
for more free time.
To date, discussion of work sharing has been somewhat 
unproductive; it has been diffused on one side by com 
mitments to more traditional job creating policies, com 
plicated by tendencies to conceptualize work sharing as tak 
ing the form of only one of the many possible approaches, 
and overly generalized by a lack of specific policy proposals 
which might be rigorously assessed. This volume will seek to 
better focus discussion by building upon available thought 
and research to outline the history of work sharing, discuss-
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ing the current relevance of sharing work, synthesizing the 
observations that should be considered in evaluating work 
sharing policies, describing and provisionally evaluating 
leading policy options, and finally seeking to assess the 
viability of the most promising options in comparison to 
other employment policies.
WORK SHARING IN THE PAST
Although the idea of sharing work has always been con 
troversial, 1 it is important to recognize that industrial 
societies have consistently applied policies to reduce and ra 
tion worktime as a means of combating joblessness. In a very 
general sense, there are two basic forms of work sharing. 
The first type is usually restricted to specific firms and used 
as a short term strategy to prevent layoffs and dismissals by 
temporarily reducing worktime. As an example, employers 
and employees in a given firm may decide to reduce the 
workweek and earnings for a short period by 10 percent as 
an alternative to laying off one-tenth of existing workers. In 
terestingly, about one-fourth of existing collective bargain 
ing agreements have formal provisions for such work shar 
ing. 2 The second type of work sharing seeks to reduce 
worktime among the employed in order to create jobs for 
those who are unemployed, thus distributing available work 
more evenly among a larger number of persons. This second 
type has been used to combat unemployment caused by long 
range conditions which are likely to persist beyond the 
periodic downswings of the business cycle.
While efforts to gain more free time have been a concern 
of labor movements dating back to the 18th century, the no 
tion of reducing worktime in order to share employment 
made its most obvious appearance in 1887 when Samuel 
Gompers, the President of the American Federation of 
Labor, declared that, ' 'As long as we have one person seek-
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ing work who cannot find it, the hours of work are too 
long." To what degree such comments reflected the intent to 
combat joblessness as opposed to a desire to justify the 
reduction of work hours remains an open question. 
Nonetheless, Gompers' position was embraced as a major 
justification for the series of worker movements to shorten 
the workweek which took place between the late 19th century 
and the 1930s.
The "Great Depression" of the 1930s fostered the first 
widespread and explicit efforts to reduce worktime in order 
to spread employment. As unemployment rose to crisis pro 
portions, employers sought to ease the burden of job loss by 
shortening workweeks as an alternative to laying off 
employees in an era when there was no unemployment in 
surance and great aversion to the few welfare programs that 
did exist. 3 The Hoover Administration made such work shar 
ing the centerpiece of its effort to control unemployment 
which was soaring over 20 percent. At the request of Presi 
dent Hoover, New Jersey Standard Oil President Walter 
Teagle toured the nation advocating worktime reductions in 
order to save jobs. 4 Even though this general concept was en 
dorsed by President of the American Federation of Labor, 
William Green, 5 the work sharing concept became un 
popular among workers. Although it was often accepted as 
the best of undesirable options, worktime reductions were 
often extensive, accompanied by major pay cuts, and regard 
ed as symbolic of a depression which many workers viewed 
as the creation of the business community and the Hoover 
Administration. 6 This resentment was summarized aptly by 
one critic's comment that work sharing was a device by 
which "industry is asking labor to bear the major costs of 
unemployment relief.'' 7
After 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt's "New Deal" made 
multifaceted initiatives to combat joblessness and economic 
hardship. The approaches used included macroeconomic
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"pump priming," major public job creation, unemployment 
insurance and other income maintenance programs, and new 
forms of work sharing that were more palatable to workers. 
Social Security, a self-proclaimed hallmark of the Roosevelt 
Administration, was passed in 1935 primarily to insure 
retirement with dignity, but also to reduce the number of 
persons seeking jobs. 8 A more direct work sharing policy 
dealt with limiting the workweek. The Black-Connery Bill, 
which limited the workweek to 30 hours, passed the Senate 
but was defeated in the House during 1933. 9 Five years 
later, Roosevelt signed into law a more flexible work limiting 
approach in the form of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938. 10 This act sought to spread employment by defining 
the standard workweek as 40 hours and imposing a time- 
and-a-half overtime pay premium for time worked over this 
standard workweek. While available data indicate that 
predepression collective bargaining followed by massive 
work sharing during the years immediately preceding 
passage of this act had driven the average workweek down to 
the neighborhood of 40 hours (see table l-l), 11 this measure 
appeared to encourage new hiring as an alternative to over 
time and has come to be regarded as the single most dramatic 
public policy to foster the sharing of employment.
World War II and the subsequent years of economic pro 
gress fostered little in the way of overt work sharing, but 
gave rise to conditions which have had a subtle effect on 
worktime trends and the distribution of employment within 
the United States. First, the combination of tax law incen 
tives for fringe benefits and occasional wage-price freezes 
gave rise to an ongoing multi-decade trend toward increasing 
fixed labor expenditures on retirement pensions, health care, 
paid time-off and other nonwage compensation. In addition 
to increasing free time, particularly in the form of earlier 
retirements, expenditures on such benefits are, for the most 
part, fixed so that their costs to employers for every hour of
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Table 1-1
Average Length of Workweek
Selected Years and Industries, 1909-1978



















































































































NOTE: Discontinuities of data collection method do not allow strict comparability of 
figures for years prior to 1947.
SOURCE: Workweek data for 1947 to 1978 cited from The Employment and Training 
Report of the President, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC, 1979, p. 322. 
Workweek data for years prior to 1947 from multiple sources cited from The Statistical 
History of the United States from Colonial Times to the Present, Fairfield Publishers, 
Stamford, CN, 1965, pp. 92 and 94.
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labor received increases as the job time of individual workers 
declines. Thus, the increase of such fixed expenditures on 
fringe benefits has become a growing barrier to worktime 
reductions. 12 Second, the growth of income maintenance 
programs such as unemployment insurance and welfare have 
tended to encourage many persons who experience difficulty 
finding employment to withdraw from the labor force. 13 
Finally, social norms and some social policies were solidified 
which tended to discourage women from holding jobs. Such 
discouragement was certainly a phenomenon rooted deeply 
in the nature of traditional family organization, but up 
through the 1960s the work sharing implications of such 
restrictions were evidenced by the common expression that 
"women should not work because they might take jobs away 
from men who must support their families." 14
During the recessionary downturns of the 1960s, alarm 
over worker displacement due to automation15 and the influx 
of the large post-World War II "baby boom" generation in 
to the labor force revived interest in limiting the sup 
ply of labor to reduce unemployment. Collective bargaining 
efforts sought to reduce the workweek, 16 promote early 
retirement, 17 and instigate more exotic policies such as the 
U.S. Steel Sabbatical. 18 Public policies also sought to reduce 
the supply of labor to match the availability of jobs. An ef 
fort by organized labor to discourage overtime by increasing 
premium pay to double-time was narrowly defeated in the 
early 1960s. 19 More important, programs were developed to 
increase the school years of youth and retirement years of 
old age. While these programs had many social purposes, 
policymakers of this era freely acknowledge that an impor 
tant goal of these programs was to reduce the size of the 
labor force. 20 These policies worked well. As one indication 
of their success, the percentage of the average U.S. male's 
total lifespan given to the nonwork activities of schooling 
and retirement increased from 35.5 percent in 1940 to about
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43 percent in 1980 (see figure I). 21 Generally high economic 
growth coupled with the somewhat subtle employment 
distribution impacts of these policies tended to downplay 
overt discussion of work sharing during this period.
The ultimate entrance of the "baby boom" generation in 
to the labor force, dramatic increase of women workers, and 
high unemployment and limited job creation fostered by 
"stagflation" once again renewed open consideration of 
work sharing during the 1970s. During and since the 1975 
recession, work sharing within individual firms occurred in 
dependent of government intervention in much the same way 
that it did during the 1930s. 22 Also serious consideration was 
catalyzed for "short-time compensation," a program used 
by European nations to provide partial UI benefits to 
workers put on reduced workweeks as an alternative to 
layoffs. 23 While several states have expressed interest in this 
concept, only California had implemented such a program 
by mid-1980. 24 Starting in 1977, a coalition of unions in 
itiated a new drive to amend the Fair Labor Standards Act so 
that the standard workweek was redefined as 35 hours and 
the overtime premium was increased to double-time. 25 Cor 
respondingly, many unions, most notably the United Auto 
Workers, reassumed their historic effort to reduce worktime 
via collective bargaining. 26 Finally, a range of novel and 
volunteeristic proposals have been put forth to share 
employment via public sabbaticals, expanded part-time jobs, 
voluntary programs allowing workers to trade earnings for 
reduced worktime, and nullification of legal barriers to 
worktime reduction. 27 In parallel fashion, many European 
nations have also developed serious policy interest in the 
potentials of work sharing in fighting joblessness. 28
Clearly, work sharing is not a new idea. Both private and 
public policies have promoted various ways of sharing and 
distributing jobs. In many cases, work sharing has been 
fostered by a number of social forces in conjunction with
Figure 1
U.S. Men's Lifetime Distribution of Education, Work, and Leisure by Primary Activity, Actual 1900,1940, 1960,
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SOURCE: Worklife expectancy figures (number of years in labor force) obtained from Howard N. Fullerton and James J. Byrne, "length of 
Working Life for Men and Women, 1970," Monthly Labor Review, February 1976, pp. 31-33; and Howard N. Fullerton, "A Table of Expected 
Working Life for Men, 1968," Monthly Labor Review, June 1971, pp. 49-54. Life expectancy figures (at birth) obtained from Statistical 
Abstracts of the United States, 1974 (Washington, DC: Bureau of the Census, 1975), p. 55. School years (completed for persons over 25) obtain 
ed from Digest of Educational Statistics for 1975 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Education, 
1975), pp. 14-15. Projected figures of worklife and life expectancy from unpublished computations provided by Howard N. Fullerton, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics. Projected years of education are estimates derived from Current Population Reports, Series 20, nos. 243 and 293, and Series 
P-25, no. 476 (Bureau of the Census).
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unemployment; and in many cases the work sharing implica 
tions of social policies have been secondary but important 
considerations. Employment has indeed been shared and ra 
tioned within most industrial societies, and this has had pro 
found impact upon the nature of unemployment and pat 
terns of work and leisure. The main issue concerning work 
sharing is not whether or not to use it. Work sharing is 
already a reality. The issues for the future are how much 
work sharing to have, and what forms it should take.
WORK SHARING IN THE FUTURE
Aside from prolonged frustration over unemployment, 
economic and social circumstances within the United States 
and other industrial nations are contributing to interest in 
sharing work. On the economic side, there appears to be an 
emerging consensus that "stagflation" is likely to persist 
well into the 1980s. The tenacity of inflation has led increas 
ing numbers of economists and policymakers to be wary of 
stimulating economic growth and job creation by 
macroeconomic demand management. As a result, op 
timistic speculations indicate real economic growth con 
siderably below past norms and pessimistic forecasts of 
unusually low growth are commonly viewed as a realistic 
possibility. 29 This emerging acceptance of sluggish economic 
growth and limited job creation has fostered consideration 
of nontraditional employment policies, such as work shar 
ing, as "second best" options for reducing unemployment 
within economies constrained by inflation.
On the social side, ongoing transitions in labor force com 
position and related changes in life styles are creating a 
climate which may be conducive to the use of work sharing. 
Demographic trends show that the large post-World War II 
"baby boom" generation has recently completed its entry in 
to the labor force. This generation, which crowded schools
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in the recent past, is now creating intense competition among 
its members and with other age groups for available jobs. 
Over the long run, the job seekers of this "baby boom" 
generation are likely to be absorbed by the labor market, 
perhaps leaving in their wake a labor shortage borne of 
smaller subsequent generations. 30 However, these ad 
justments will not occur overnight and labor force growth 
from other sources is likely to foster extremely intense com 
petition for employment into the 21st century.
Most notably, the labor force participation of women rose 
from 32.7 percent in 1948 to 50.1 percent in 1978, 31 and it is 
likely to continue rising in coming decades. 32 As an indica 
tion of what may occur in the long run in the United States 
and other nations, the participation rate of women in 
Sweden is almost equal to that of men. 33 This increase of 
women will not only intensify labor market competition, but 
also tend to alter the worktime preferences and needs of 
tomorrow's labor force. As the proportion of dual-earner 
families increases along with women workers, the typical 
household of the future will experience tremendous time 
pressures in the performance of family responsibilities and 
pursuit of leisure activities. 34 At the same time, dual-earner 
families will have increased financial discretion to forego 
income-earning worktime for more free time. 35
In addition to women workers, it appears likely that many 
older workers may resist retirement because of nervousness 
about the impact of inflation on fixed incomes. 36 This would 
block the promotion of younger persons and increase the size 
of the labor force. While it is still too early to claim an 
established trend in this direction, there are indications that 
the tendency toward earlier retirement may have halted. 37 
Correspondingly, there are signs that while large portions of 
older workers prefer to remain employed past traditional 
retirement age, they also prefer to work less than full time. 38 
For example, one representative survey of the American
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labor force found that 28 percent of those aged 50 to 64 
preferred to retire at age 65, 9.4 percent were undecided 
about their retirement plans, and that the remaining 62.3" 
percent wished to keep working. Some 84.6 percent of those 
wishing to work preferred to work either part-year or part- 
week. 39
An overview of the increasing propensity to work among 
all persons comes from past and projected labor force par 
ticipation rates. In short, the proportion of the U.S. popula 
tion over age 16 who are either employed or looking for 
employment rose from 60.4 to 63.7 percent between 1970 
and 1979, and is projected to rise to 67.9 percent by 1990 and 
68.6 by 1995 (see table 1-2). While there has been specula 
tion of future labor shortages due to the lack of entry level 
workers following the "baby boom" generation, 40 it is more 
likely that previously mentioned trends will far outweigh the 
lack of entry level workers. Indeed, labor economist Eli 
Ginzberg convincingly demonstrated that there were some 17 
million persons in 1977 who would be likely to enter the 
labor force if the possibilities of finding a job increase. 41 
Thus, it is quite likely that the labor force participation rate 
will grow faster than Bureau of Labor Statistics 
projections. 42
In sum, a number of fundamental social trends are likely 
to foster a long term growth of labor force participation 
rates despite a scarcity of employment opportunities. 
However, while a larger portion of the U.S. and other 
populations may seek employment, increasing proportions 
are likely to prefer less than what we currently define as "full 
time" employment. In terms of employment policies, growth 
of labor force participation is likely to intensify the demand 
for more jobs, while preferences for reduced worktime may 
increase the acceptability of work sharing as a means of com 
bating joblessness.43
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Table 1-2















































SOURCE: Figures for 1950, 1960, 1970, and 1975 computed from 1977 Employment and 
Training Report of the President, U.S. Department of Labor, p. 135, Table A-7; figures for 
1978 computed from John Bregger and Kathryn Hoyle, "The Employment Situation," 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Press Release 79-181, February 1979, p. 2; and projections 
for 1985, 1990, and 1995 cited from Howard N. Fullerton, "The 1995 Labor Force: A First 
Look," Monthly Labor Review, December 1980, pp. 11-21.
Persistent unemployment coupled with changing social 
conditions is likely to foster ongoing and growing interest in 
reducing worktime to combat joblessness. This interest not 
withstanding, important policy questions must be answered 
concerning whether work sharing is a viable approach to the 
problems of unemployment. Would it actually create jobs? 
Would it be costly and inflationary? What types of secon 
dary effects would it have?
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